The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of a doctor and nursing home in the case of Fields v. Taylor, decided January 18, 2017, holding that the trial court erred in granting the motion on proximate cause. Plaintiffs alleged their mother died as a result of sepsis from a decubitus ulcer that developed during a stay at the defendant rehab facility. Plaintiffs presented the testimony of a well-known medical examiner, who opined that the cause of death was sepsis from the wound in his opinion. Defendants moved to exclude the expert’s opinions as unreliable, which was denied, and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to present an expert to opine on the connection between the cause of death and the specific acts of negligence, which they called “proximate cause.” (Note – we would call this “cause-in-fact”).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to exclude, holding that the expert properly used the “differential diagnosis” method and then drew conclusions based on experience. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the Plaintiffs were not required to produce expert testimony specifically on “proximate cause” and that the testimony of several experts can be pieced together to create a fact dispute. In this case, Plaintiffs presented a standard of care expert and the medical examiner expert. Together, their testimony was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.
The take-home is that it continues to be difficult to win summary judgment on proximate cause in medical malpractice cases, even when the expert testimony appears weak and disconnected.